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I Introduction 
PpT HE major purpose of this work is to im- 
prove our understanding of investment be- 
havior in one important industry, the railroad 
industry, over some seven decades of American 
history. This investigation makes one impor- 
tant departure from most investment studies. 
The primary emphasis is to isolate the likely 
changes in investment behavior which occur as 
the industry passes through a fairly predictable 
set of institutional and growth phases. The 
basic thesis, explicitly tested in the material 
that follows, is that the determinants of invest- 
ment depend critically upon the phase of the 
industry's life-cycle. For example, the relative 
importance of capital costs for firm expansion 
may assume quite different proportions for a 
mature industry than for one beginning adoles- 
cent growth. In the same fashion, the relative 
importance of internal profits as a source of 
funds is likely to vary with the position of the 
industry in its life-cycle. In addition, the speed 
of response to evidence of profitability may 
change with the age of the industry, its growth, 
and its ability to absorb risk. We present below 
an extensive description of expected shifts in 
the railroad industry's investment behavior 
over time. 
The reasons for selecting the railroads should 
be evident. This is one of the few American 
industries for which we have considerable in- 
vestment data relating to the major portion of 
its complete life-cycle. Recently, information 
covering the period since 1870 became avail- 
able with the appearance of Ulmer's impressive 
volume [21]. Ulmer has assembled annual 
estimates of gross and net investment, output, 
and capital stock, all in constant and current 
prices. Although Fishlow has recently pointed 
out some weaknesses in Ulmer's data,' it ap- 
pears to us unduly cautious to abstain from 
using this wealth of historical information while 
awaiting future revisions. 
This introductory background gives rise to 
the following plan for this paper. Section II 
reviews and classifies the historical background 
of railroad development over our period of in- 
terest. In that section we develop and define 
the life-cycle stages which we use in the tests 
themselves. Section III presents the models of 
investment behavior which we attempt to test 
in section IV. Section V follows with a sum- 
mary of the study's results. 
II Stages of Growth 
Ulmer's estimates of railroad investment and 
output are an obvious aid in defining the in- 
dustry's growth stages over the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. Concentrating 
our attention on periods of peak investment 
rates, it would appear that net railroad invest- 
ment increased by increasing amounts between 
1840 and 1857. Between the approximate dates 
1857 and 1881, net capital formation increased 
by decreasing amounts while the subsequent 
period 1881-1931, was one of declining net 
capital formation but at levels which were still 
typically positive. After 1931, the level of net 
railroad investment was generally negative. 
Furthermore, gross capital formation most cer- 
tainly reached an all-time high in the pre- 
World War I decade. 
We are also able to quantify our impression- 
istic notions concerning the relative importance 
of the railroads in total aggregate demand. The 
output of the railroads as a share of gross na- 
tional product reached its maximum during the 
period of intensive World War I use (1910- 
1920). At that time the share was as large as *This topic was initially suggested some time ago by 
Moses Abramovitz. We express our thanks to the Social 
Systems Research Institute of the University of Wisconsin 
for their support of the study and to Leonard Weiss and 
Allen Kelley for their helpful comments. 
[ 172 ] 
'Professor Fishlow's remarks were made at the Septem- 
ber 1963 Conference on Research in Income and Wealth and 
can be found in his as yet unpublished manuscript [10]. 
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eight or nine per cent [21, p. 90]. Gross invest- 
ment, however, achieved a peak level of relative 
importance much earlier. During the years 
1870-1895 the railroads accounted for some- 
thing like 13 per cent of aggregate gross invest- 
ment. That share declined to about seven per 
cent over the period 1890-1914 and then to 
approximately three per cent over the decades 
1920-1940 [22, p. 138]. 
A detailed examination of railroad invest- 
ment reveals severe short-run fluctuations. 
More important, ". . . well-known long cycles 
in railroad construction . . ." are exhibited 
over these 70 years [1, p. 238]. There appear 
to be approximately three of these violent 
swings between the dates 1872 and 1941 and 
they suggest a possible separation of the period 
into life-cycle stages (see figure 1). Tenta- 
tively, we decided on the following separation: 
GROSS AND NET CAPITAL ExPENDITURES IN UNITED 
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an early period of adolescence, 1872-1895, a 
middle period of maturity, 1896-1914, and, dis- 
carding the unusual war years of governmental 
control a final period of senility, 1922-1941.2 
The fortuitous nature of the long swing breaks 
in 1896 and World War I impose our terminal 
years, but more evidence is required to justify 
our assumption of distinct phases in the indus- 
try's life-cycle. We have already reviewed some 
of the evidence to support our choice. To sum- 
marize, in the early period of adolescence the 
railroads are still growing at a pace exceeding 
the average for the economy as a whole; in the 
middle period of maturity the industry, while 
still expanding, is no longer a dynamic sector 
relative to the rest of the economy; in the latter 
period of senility the industry eventually under- 
goes a general absolute decline. 
The changing regional nature of American 
railroad investment offers additional support 
for our choice of discontinuous stages. One 
distinctive aspect of the 1870's and 1880's is 
that these are the last decades in which exten- 
sive railroad investment was taking place. 
After the mid-1890's, the continental railroad 
network was more or less complete. "Much of 
the railroad building [1879-1881] consisted of 
completing the main lines of roads which had 
been stopped by the panic of 1873. The North- 
ern Pacific, for instance, completed its route" 
[9, p. 115]. Even at that, the last decade of our 
early period of adolescence is a transitional one: 
Even more important [during the 1880's] was the con- 
struction of feeders and branches for parent lines .. 
For the most part, therefore, construction was under- 
taken not by new enterprises but by established lines to 
which it was becoming more of a routine operation than 
a venture into innovation [9, p. 116]. 
This suggests another important life-cycle dis- 
tinction. In the early period, railroad expansion 
in new regions - and to some extent the rate 
of new firm entrance - was still significant al- 
though it was of declining importance. In con- 
trast, the era of consolidation, merger, and 
restriction on new firm entry reached real sig- 
nificance in the first decade of the twentieth 
century. This may be in part related to the 
exhaustion of possibilities for extensive single 
track mileage and the disappearance of unex- 
ploited regions. In any case, by 1900 the five 
dominant systems -the Morgan-Hill, Harri- 
man, Pennsylvania, Vanderbilt, and Gould- 
Rockefeller systems- controlled about one- 
half of the 258 million miles in operation at that 
time [2,p. 170]. 
In addition, the sharp changes in the methods 
used by the railroads in securing financing sug- 
gest distinctive stages. Only about 2.4 per cent 
of railroad gross investment was financed by 
retained profits and depreciation charges in the 
1880's, a fact typical of a still young and rapidly 
growing industry with large capital require- 
2 It is worth noting that Koyck [17], in a study of invest- 
ment in freight cars, also distinguished between a "period of 
expansion" (1894-1915) and a "period of contraction" 
(1920-1939). 
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ments per firm unit. This proportion increased 
somewhat to 9.5 per cent for the period 1893- 
1907 but then jumped sharply to 42.6 per cent 
during 1907-1916. By the 1920's, the transi- 
tion to internal financing was apparently al- 
most complete since the share reached 94.8 
per cent during the decade 1921-1930 and 97.4 
per cent during the 1930's. The abrupt secular 
shift from external to internal financing is just 
as evident if one examines the ratio of retained 
profits to total sources. By the 1907-1916 
period the figure had reached 29.7 per cent, 
and in the decade 1921-1930, 50.8 per cent 
[21, Table 46, p. 150]. 
The long-run transition between bond and 
stock issues as a method of external financing is 
less dramatic, but still significant. During the 
decade of the 1880's, about 56 per cent of total 
new railroad security issues (excluding refund- 
ing) was in the form of bonds. During the im- 
mediate pre-World War I era, 1907-1916, that 
proportion had risen to 63.2 per cent, while 
during the 1920's it was as high as 71.5 per cent 
[21, Table 46, p. 150]. 
It should also be recognized that the struc- 
ture of investment itself underwent significant 
change over the period 1872-1941. Although 
empirical verification is impossible, most of the 
current research on American railroads sug- 
gests that the relative importance of rolling to 
fixed stock remained almost constant until the 
very end of the nineteenth century. At that 
time, and throughout the 1920's and 1930's, 
rolling stock increased in importance as a share 
of net railroad investment. Furthermore, the 
significance of main track declined as the indus- 
try progressed, revealing the increasingly in- 
tensive nature of railroad investment. The 
increase in main track in the 1870's amounted 
to as much as 80 per cent of total mileage 
added. In the 1880's the share was approx- 
imately 70 per cent, but by the 1899-1909 
decade, when the industry matures, that ratio 
had fallen to only seven per cent [10, Table 2, 
p. 15]. 
A final comment concerns the role of govern- 
mental interference. As far as the federal land 
grants are concerned, they should have little 
influence upon investment behavior during our 
period of study since the last federal railroad 
land grant was authorized on March 3, 187 1.3 
With regard to legislation over the railroads, 
neither state nor federal control really became 
effective until a few years prior to the first 
World War. The railroad's stage of maturity is, 
then, a transitional one between the stage of 
adolescence, relatively free of intervention, and 
the period of senility, one of severe govern- 
mental control inaugurated decisively with the 
Transportation Act of 1920. 
III Hypotheses 
Of particular interest to us is a study of 
United States railroad investment carried out 
by Klein [16] some years ago for the period 
1922-1941. Klein constructed and estimated a 
large number of regression models and con- 
cluded that the most satisfactory results were 
given by the following two relationships: 
I = 1596 + 0.75 7rt- -51 it - 0.14 Kt- 
(0.08) (18) (0.02) 
+ut, R2=0.903 (1) 
or 
It = 2647 + 0.88 7rt- -69 it-, - 0.20 Kt- 
(0.09) (15) (0.02) 
-301 qtl + ut, 0R20.941 (2) 
(128) 
where 
IG= gross expenditure on road and equipment 
in 1910-1914 prices, 
= net railway operating income before depre- 
ciation, deflated by a railroad construction 
cost index, 
i= average yield on new railroad bonds (per- 
centage), 
q = price index of railroad capital goods, 1910- 
1914 = 100, and 
K= end of year stock of fixed capital in road 
and equipment in 1910-1914 prices. 
Although there are some difficulties concern- 
ing interpretation,4 Klein's comprehensive ef- 
fort to explain the variations in railroad invest- 
ment during the inter-war period is impressive 
3 Furthermore, ". . . the entire federal outlay and most 
of the state and local commitments were made in the few 
years before 1873 . . .in the wave of new investment that 
brought the total of railroad capitalization in 1890 to more 
than $10,000,000,000, public agencies contributed no more 
than a negligible fraction [12, p. 271] ." 
' See Eisner and Strotz [8, pp. 147-149]. 
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and the models appear to us to deserve further 
testing. At the time of his inquiry the new and 
presumably improved set of data compiled by 
Ulmer was not available. If Klein's models for 
the period 1922-1941 are appropriate and if 
Ulmer's data are indeed superior to the data 
used by Klein,5 then the re-estimated equations 
should be at least as satisfactory as his original 
estimates. 
A further test of Klein's models arises from 
our emphasis upon life-cycle investment analy- 
sis. The central theme of our study is that 
investment in the railroads can best be ex- 
plained by models which differ according to the 
historical stage of the industry's growth. A 
competing hypothesis would assert that the 
same model is applicable to every stage of the 
industry's life-cycle. Since Klein's models ap- 
pear to be quite successful explanations of in- 
vestment behavior during the inter-war period, 
they should be suitable for testing the "single 
model" hypothesis. If his models withstand 
this test, the result would be inconsistent with 
the hypothesis of differential behavior over an 
industry's life-cycle. 
On the other hand, if a single investment 
model is inappropriate for all stages of the in- 
dustry's lifetime, we must be prepared to de- 
velop alternative models for each of these 
industry stages. As suggested above, logical 
distinction can be made between the period of 
adolescent development, that of mature growth, 
and that of stagnation or decline. Thus we 
need three, presumably different, stage-of- 
growth models (to be referred to as "SG mod- 
els") to describe the time pattern of aggregate 
railroad investment. 
Let us first consider the process of investment 
determination in the adolescent stage. In this 
period, from 1872 to the mid-1890's, entry of 
firms into the industry is relatively frequent. 
New railroad investment is carried out in part 
by firms already in the industry (predominant- 
ly in the older Eastern and Midwestern re- 
gions), and in part by firms entering the indus- 
try for the first time (predominantly in the 
newer Southern and Western regions). The 
"old" firms operate with a given quantity of 
fixed capital constructed in past railroad booms 
and/or in expectation of future long-run de- 
mands. The level of existing fixed and rolling 
stock might be considered optimal for a given 
anticipated demand for output, which may in- 
clude a certain degree of planned excess capac- 
ity.6 If the demand for transportation services 
on existing railroads increases, the rolling and 
fixed stock will be insufficient in relation to 
demand. Profits, both in absolute levels as well 
as in relation to existing stock, will increase 
providing there exists some excess capacity. If 
a firm is already at full capacity, further in- 
crease in demand will be met only with increases 
in per unit costs. Unless railroad rates are in- 
creased, profits will cease to grow and may even 
decline. The firm may offset these deleterious 
effects by charging higher rates for transporta- 
tion services and/or by expanding fixed capital. 
The first course of action - increase in price 
- is less likely to be taken in theory and was 
avoided in fact. Prices of railroad services were 
not typically flexible in the short-run, and per- 
haps more important, excessive rates invited 
competition as well as public reaction.7 To 
pursue this simulation, "old" firms may not 
wait until all excess capacity is eliminated but 
may undertake new investment as the point of 
full capacity is approached. It appears then 
that the investment decision of firms already in 
the industry is likely to be based on the rela- 
tionship of the existing stock of capital to that 
which would be optimal under prevailing output 
conditions. 
The completeness of the capital stock adjust- 
ment model requires two further assumptions. 
First, it must be assumed that firms expect the 
changes in demand to be permanent, otherwise 
there would hardly be any rational basis for 
changing the size of capital stock in response to 
past changes in demand. This is not an unreas- 
onable assumption for the 1870's and 1880's 
- a stage characterized by strong secular in- 
creases for railroad services. Second, this 
framework assumes a relative absence of invest- 
'Klein's gross investment figures come from [14, p. 351. 
His cost index is taken from [151. 
6The romantic case in traditional history texts, but ap- 
parently of little quantitative importance after 1870 and 
relative to American railroad investment as a whole, is the 
developmental road which is constructed in anticipation of 
future urban growth and interregional trade. See, for ex- 
ample. Cootner [5]. 
7 Very early in their history, the railroads reveal a desire 
to restrict ". . . competition to certain areas and to service 
rather than price." Cochran [4, p. 160]. 
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ment attributable to cost-reducing innovations. 
There is some qualitative evidence which sug- 
gests that cost reducing innovations were not 
typically a motivating force per se but that such 
improvements as the steel rail, treated ties, 
Diesel engines and automatic couplers were 
utilized only when old equipment was being 
replaced or when new demand-induced invest- 
ment was undertaken.8 
A final question remains concerning the role 
of the rate of interest in investment decision- 
making. In equilibrium, the marginal efficiency 
of capital of the last project will just equal the 
prevailing rate of interest. In the early stage 
of industry growth, however, disequilibrium is 
more likely in the sense that the long-run mar- 
ginal efficiency of the last project exceeds the 
interest rate by a considerable margin. Under 
these conditions, fluctuations in the rate of in- 
terest (or some alternative measure of money 
capital costs), unless very marked, are likely 
to be largely irrelevant. 
With respect to the lag structure, the reac- 
tions of management are likely to be relatively 
slow. Early railroad development took place in 
an era of inefficient communication systems, 
administrative procedures, and capital raising 
methods. Furthermore, given the relative 
growth of the industry in the 1870's and 1880's 
as compared to the 1920's, the composition of 
new investment was more of the long gestation 
type. A two-year lag would then appear to be 
appropriate in the earlier period since the facts 
bearing upon investment decisions were likely 
to have become known only in the next year, 
and the investment decision itself probably did 
not become effective until the year after.9 
In addition to investment carried out by 
firms already in the industry, in boom condi- 
tions new firms will tend to enter and establish 
a fixed capital base. The basic difference be- 
tween the "old" and "new" firms is the element 
of risk which is considerably greater for new 
entrants in the less developed regions. These 
may have to be assured of fairly high profits 
before they may be able to raise the necessary 
finance. The firmest basis for estimates of fu- 
ture returns on capital is the profit experience 
of the existing firms. New firms will be induced 
to enter if the existing firms are exhibiting high 
profit rates, and especially if profits are show- 
ing an upward trend. Here again, because of 
the time needed for decision-making, capital 
raising and construction, a two-year lag is likely 
to be most appropriate.10 
If we combine the two types of investment 
behavior into a single model and assume lin- 
earity, we can express the postulated relation- 
ship as 
It = ao + al(lXt-2 -Kt-2) + L2(7T*/K)t-2 
+ a3 (7T- -7r2 + ut, (SG 1) 
where 
I= net investment, 
X = output, 
K = capital stock at the beginning of each 
period, 
* = net operating income after depreciation, 
and 
u = random disturbance. 
The constant term, ao, is included as a provi- 
sion for the possible existence of "autonomous" 
investment. The coefficient a, is the reaction 
coefficient which reflects the speed of adjust- 
ment to a capital stock disequilibrium on the 
part of entrepreneurs while 81 is a measure of 
the "normal" capital-output ratio and (81 X) 
is then the size of capital stock which is con- 
8 Cootner takes this view in a recent article [5]. "Even 
with the steady, gradual improvement in the economics of 
producing rail transport, the impetus to the eventual inte- 
gration of the railroad invention into United States economic 
life came primarily from demand" [5, p. 484]. Further, he 
states "It is clear . . . that I find no evidence anywhere in 
the process of railroad development of anything that would 
constitute a technical jump great enough to generate an 
exogenous railroad boom . . . . The railroads experienced 
constant technical improvement -larger locomotives, big- 
ger and better designed rails, better brakes, substitution of 
coal for wood as fuel, etc. -but there is no record of . . . 
discontinuous change. . . ." [5, pp. 504-505]. 
Commenting on the pre-1890's Cochran says that "This 
meant, in turn, that the readiness with which the executive 
installed a new invention or method was related to the im- 
mediate outlay of capital required and the business situation 
. . .downturns of the business cycle often forestalled capital 
expenditures for new devices, regardless of their promise" 
[4, p. 144]. 
9Tinbergen [20], in his study of United States invest- 
ment in rolling stock (1896-19,13), used a lag of 1.5 years. 
This is reasonably consistent with our choice of a two-year 
lag since we are limited by annual data and are concerned 
with both fixed and rolling stock. 
10 Ideally, a more powerful test of these theories would 
be the independent examination of investment behavior of 
new versus old firms or of investment in new versus old 
regions. Unfortunately, data are not yet available for such 
regional disaggregation. 
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sidered by entrepreneurs as appropriate under 
output conditions given by X." 
Let us now consider the second stage of the 
railroad industry's life-cycle. This stage (1896- 
1914) is characterized by expansion and con- 
solidation of the existing firms since there is 
now very little room for opening up of new 
territories, and thus only a limited opportunity 
for new entries. The industry undergoes con- 
siderable re-organization to conform to the new 
pattern of market distribution, mergers occur 
at a peak rate, and profits run at a relatively 
high and secularly stable level. Under these 
new environmental conditions, "old" railroad 
companies still tend to undertake new invest- 
ment if output outruns the existing rolling and 
fixed stock. Disinvestment, as in the mid- 
1890's, may even take place if the existing 
capital stock is abundant relative to output. 
Since new entries are rare, the profit variables 
are less likely to be relevant. Investment de- 
termination in the second stage of the industry's 
life-cycle its middle age - is then hypothe- 
sized to be: 
It = 1o + 81 (82Xt-2 - Kt2) + ut, (SG 2) 
where the variables are defined as in the pre- 
vious model. 
The final stage of the industry's life-cycle, 
the period of senility (1922-1941), is one of 
slow growth or even decline in the face of high- 
way and airplane competition. Some firms leave 
the industry altogether, while net investment is 
largely motivated by changes in technology 
(rather than demand) as well as government 
regulations concerning service. Firms in the 
industry are concerned with survival rather 
than growth. The remaining firms are typically 
reluctant, or may find it difficult, to acquire 
capital from external sources and some of the 
profits may be ploughed back into the firms 
partly for the purpose of staying in business.'2 
Under these circumstances, levels or changes 
in output and profitability are largely irrelevant 
for investment decisions because they have 
very little relation to the long-run prospects of 
the industry. The stock-adjustment model 
would appear to be less applicable when the 
size of the total stock of fixed capital is near 
the "saturation" level. Net investment will be 
carried out largely as a result of replacing worn 
out equipment by new, technologically superior 
equipment. Any increase in the size of capital 
stock is associated with a decline in its average 
"age," and diminishes opportunities for replace- 
ment and thus for new investment.13 The finan- 
cial situation of firms will now become relevant 
since the firm's earning level is the major source 
of finance. The level of past profits thus as- 
sumes a new role. Instead of being an indicator 
of future profitability, profits now become an 
indicator of the availability of funds. A feas- 
ible model describing the investment behavior 
at this stage of the industry's life-cycle might 
then be 
It = Y0 + y1Kt_l +2* + t (SG 3) 
where x** equals net income (including non- 
operating income). This model includes net 
income rather than net operating income since 
income from all sources is relevant when avail- 
ability of finance - as distinct from a profit- 
ability measure - becomes crucial. The hy- 
pothesized change in lag from two years to one 
year can be explained both by the increased 
efficiency of communications, management and 
capital market transactions and by the secular 
decline in the importance of railroad invest- 
ment of longer gestation. 
IV Empirical Results 
The tests of the hypotheses described in the 
previous section have been carried out by ob- 
taining least squares estimates of the regression 
coefficients and their standard errors. The 
sources of the data are given in the appendix. 
The results are presented below. 
Klein's Models 1' 
Period of adolescence, 1872-1895: 
1a= 201 + 2.63 lrt-1 + 87.15 it-, 
(1129) (0.87) (119.50) 
l'The model could be rewritten to allow for planned ex- 
cess capacity as advocated by Chenery [3]. There is no 
way, however, of statistically distinguishing between our 
model and a Chenery-type model unless we have an inde- 
pendent estimate of the coefficient of planned capacity 
utilization. 
'2This statement is not to imply that railroad firms are 
not capable of finding external finance in reasonably mobile 
equipment in times of prosperity, or that they do not invest 
some of their profits in other industries. Our concern here 
is merely to emphasize the importance of internal financing 
in a declining industry. See [6, p. 901. 
1s This argument seems particularly applicable to the 
1920's. 
t' In estimating (K 1) for 1922-1941, Klein used the bond 
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-0.20 Kt-1 + ut, R2 = 0.455 (K1) 
(0.06) 
I = -2053 + 4.39 7rt-1 + 67.33 it-1 
(1095) (0.85) (94.90) 
-0.33 Kt-1 + 52.17 qtil + ut, I2 - 0.675. 
(0.06) (14.56) 
(K2) 
Period of maturity, 1896-1914: 
It =-4276 + 2.11 7rt-1 + 467.70 it-1 
(1741) (0.47) (448.90) 
- 0.013 Kt-1 + ut, R2 = 0.767; (Ki) 
(0.047) 
It = -1420 + 0.47 rt-I + 90.17 it-i 
(2029) (0.86) (437.80) 
-0.107 Kt1 + 56.55 qt-l + 1ut, 
(0.060) (25.64) 
2 = 0.824. (K2) 
Period of senility, 1922-1941: 
If' = 3952 + 1.067rt-1 + 71.39 it-l 
(611) (0.10) (33.16) 
-0.22 Kt-, + it, R12 = 0.908; (K1) 
(0.03) 
It = 3281 + 0.977rt-1 + 59.58 it-1 
(920) (0.13) (35.35) 
- 0.20 Kt-1 + 3.86 qt-l + Rt, 12 = 0.913. 
(0.03) (3.97) 
(K2) 
IG = gross investment deflated by q (millions of 
dollars), 
7r= net operating income including deprecia- 
tion, deflated by q (millions of dollars), 
i = railroad bond yields (percentages), 
K = capital stock deflated by q (millions of dol- 
lars), and 
q = railroad construction cost index, 1929 = 
100. 
Klein's own estimates were based on data for 
the period 1922-1941 and both models were 
found to be satisfactory. The same conclusion 
cannot be drawn if the models are re-estimated 
on the basis of Ulmer's data. The most signifi- 
cant change is in the sign of the coefficient at- 
tached to the bond yields variable which now 
becomes positive - a result which is clearly 
unacceptable on theoretical grounds."5 An ad- 
ditional conflict arises with the coefficient of 
qt-i which becomes positive, although not sig- 
nificant. 
The application of Klein's models to the early 
and middle periods also gives unsatisfactory 
results. The coefficient of the bond yield var- 
iable is not significantly different from zero 
and, furthermore, it appears to be persistently 
positive.16 In addition, a test for the presence 
of autocorrelation indicated that in both periods 
disturbances in the regression equations were 
most probably autocorrelated. If Ulmer's data 
are reasonably reliable, then it is obvious that 
Klein's models do not stand up to more exten- 
sive examination. They are unsuccessful not 
only in explaining investment behavior in the 
earlier periods, but also in producing sensible 
results for the period for which they were 
designed. 
Let us now consider the empirical results re- 
garding the stage-of-growth models developed 
in the preceding section of this paper. 
Stage-of-Growth Models 
Period of adolescence, 1873-1895: 
t = 697 + 1.03 Xt-2 - 0.24 Kt-2 
(382) (0.27) (0.05) 
+ 278.3 (7r*/K)t-2 + 2.00(7*_- 
(41.6) (0.67) 
+ut R2 = 0.807. (SG 1) 
Period of Maturity, 1896-1914: 
It = 778 + 0.42 Xt-2 - 0.10 Kt-2 +Ut, 
(481) (0.09) (0.04) 
2 = 0.821. (SG 2) 
Period of senility, 1922-1941: 
It = 3344 - 0.16 Kt-, + 0.71<** +At, 
(614) (0.03) (0.06) 
R2 = 0.898. (SG 3) 
yield variable without lag but indicated that a lag of one 
year could have been used with equal justification and that, 
in fact, the estimate was not materially affected. 
15The bond yield measure used in the re-estimated re- 
gression equation differs slightly from that used by Klein. 
The equations were also re-estimated using the Klein series 
of bond yields in conjunction with Ulmer's data for the 
remaining variables but the results did not differ substan- 
tially from those given in the text above. 
'6 For all three periods, this result appeared consistently. 
External cost constraints, either measured by bond yields or 
stock yields, never seem to have had a systematic depressing 
influence upon aggregate railroad investment, regardless of 
the industry's stage-of-growth. 
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IN = net investment deflated by q (millions of 
dollars), 
X = railroad operating revenue deflated by q 
(millions of dollars), 
K = capital stock deflated by q (millions of dol- 
lars), 
7* = net operating income excluding deprecia- 
tion deflated by q (millions of dollars), 
7** = net income deflated by q (millions of dol- 
lars), and 
,,*/K in (SG 1) is given in percentage rates. 
The statistical results of the stage-of-growth 
analysis of investment behavior are satisfac- 
tory. A Durbin-Watson test revealed that auto- 
correlation of disturbances was likely to be 
present only in the middle period, and the 
standard errors of the coefficients given in (SG 
2) are corrected to allow for this.'7 Even after 
this adjustment, all three stage-of-growth mod- 
els have statistically significant coefficients of 
the expected sign, and the goodness of fit is 
reasonably high. It might be noted here that 
we used each of these three models to explain 
investment behavior in each period and found, 
as predicted, that they had poor explanatory 
power when removed from the life-cycle en- 
vironment for which they were developed. It 
would appear that the use of different invest- 
ment models for different periods of industry 
development is clearly superior to the uniform 
model approach. 
The investment relation for the early devel- 
opment stage indicates that autonomous invest- 
ment in the railroads was probably negligible 
during the 1870's, 1880's, and early 1890's. 
The coefficients of the stock-adjustment factors 
give an estimated "normal" capital-output ratio 
of 4.36 and a "reaction" coefficient of about 
0.24.18 Furthermore, both profitability indi- 
cators, presumably showing their influence on 
investment by new firms, clearly appear to be 
important explanatory variables. The relative 
importance of the two sources of variation in 
investment - the stock-adjustment and the ex- 
pected profitability measures - should be of 
some interest. We have evaluated this by 
taking into account the magnitudes of the co- 
efficients as well as the variation in the respec- 
tive explanatory variables. Apart from the 
changes in investment due to joint variation, 
we found that changes in profitability measures 
were somewhat more important in affecting 
variation in railroad investment than changes 
in the stock-adjustment variables.'9 
As a matter of interest, we have also fitted a 
relationship similar to (SG 1) but one in which 
the stock adjustment variables were replaced 
by a single variable (Xt1 -Xt-2), a simple 
accelerator principle. Whether we tested the 
simple accelerator by itself or combined with 
profitability indicators, the results were poor. 
The goodness of fit was much lower than that 
of (SG 1) and, more important, the accelera- 
tion coefficient was smaller than its standard 
error. 
The regression equation relating to the stage 
of mature growth reveals that a very high pro- 
portion of the variation in aggregate railroad 
investment can be explained by stock-adjust- 
ment factors alone. Autonomous investment is 
again found to be probably negligible. The 
estimate of the "normal" capital-output ratio 
for this period is 4.08 while the "reaction" co- 
efficient is considerably lower than that of the 
earlier period.20 The numerical values of the 
coefficients were little affected by changing the 
17 For the development of the correction formula see, 
for example, Goldberger [11, pp. 236-243]. 
18 If there were some planned excess capacity and Chen- 
ery's modification of the stock-adjustment model applied, 
the "normal" capital-output ratio would be somewhat lower 
and the "reaction" coefficient somewhat higher than the 
quoted figures. In any case the result appears to be con- 
sistent with the findings of other research workers, e.g., Kuh 
[18] or Koyck [17]. Kuh in [18, p. 334] writes, "Perhaps 
the principal explanation for this low magnitude in estimated 
reaction coefficients . . . is the pervasive uncertainty of 
manufacturers about the expected level of capacity utiliza- 
tion." 
19 This result was mildly surprising. Our theoretical dis- 
cussion in the preceding section suggested that the profit- 
ability measures would have assumed greater relative impor- 
tance in the pre-1870's when the industry could be described 
as being dominated more by new firms than by old ones. 
The relative importance of the two sets of factors can be 
established by comparing the following two magnitudes: 
Variation due to stock-adjustment 
= [(1.026)2Var (Xt-2) + (0.235)2Var (Kt-2) 
-2 (1.026) (0.235) 'Cov (Xt-2, Kt-2)]1/2 = 145.32. (i) 
Variation due to profitability 
7r* 
= [(1.995)2 Var (Air-* ) + (278.3)2 Var ( ) 
7r* 
+ 2(1.995)(278.3) Cov (A7r* ...)]1/2 = 219.11. 
Kt-2 ODi 20 Again, this result is consistent with that of Koyck [17] 
who found a decline in the reaction coefficient in response 
to a decline in the long-run expected trend rate of growth. 
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lag from two years to one, but the statistical 
fit was poorer with the shorter lag and the dis- 
turbances appeared to be much more highly 
autocorrelated. The simple acceleration prin- 
ciple again produced very poor results. 
For the period of senility, 1922-1941, the 
levels of last year's profits and last year's cap- 
ital stock appear to produce a good explanation 
of investment variation. Along with some posi- 
tive autonomous investment, it seems that on 
the average every unit increase in the capital 
stock resulted in a 0.16 unit decrease in net 
investment in the following year while about 
71 per cent of each increase in net income was 
re-invested. An analysis of the relative impor- 
tance of K and z**X reveals that changes in 
net income were more important sources of 
variation in investment than changes in the size 
of capital stock.2' When either bond or stock 
yields were included, their coefficients were not 
significant. 
V Concluding Summary 
This paper has attempted to explain invest- 
ment behavior in the American railroads over 
the period 1872-1941. A theoretical argument 
has been made for expecting different patterns 
of investment behavior to be associated with 
different positions in the industry's life-cycle. 
Consequently, the entire period 1872-1941 has 
been divided into a stage of adolescence from 
1872 to 1895, a stage of maturity from 1896 to 
the first World War, and a stage of senility for 
the inter-war period. This division has been 
justified by the changes of basic industry char- 
acteristics in each of the periods of railroad 
development. 
It has been found that a "single model" ap- 
proach to explain investment behavior breaks 
down when applied to differing stages of rail- 
road development. On the other hand, the 
stage-of-growth models have produced very 
satisfactory results. In particular, we found 
that in the first two periods - the periods of 
adolescence and of maturity - a significant 
proportion of the variation in investment could 
be explained by the "stock-adjustment prin- 
ciple." In the first period, the stock adjustment 
model was extended to explain the somewhat 
different investment behavior of firms develop- 
ing in new regions. In the period of maturity, 
in which the industry raised its barriers to new 
entry and the older firms increased their oligop- 
olistic control, the stock-adjustment principle 
alone produced a very good explanation. In 
both of these periods, the simple acceleration 
principle proved to be a poor substitute for 
the stock-adjustment model. Finally, in the 
inter-war period of stagnation and decline of 
the railroad industry the explanation of invest- 
ment behavior was traced to the influence of 
changes in internal funds and in size of capital 
stock, the former being more influential than 
the latter. At no stage in the industry's life- 
cycle were external costs of securing capital of 
importance in constraining aggregate railroad 
investment. 
The stage-of-growth approach to investment 
analysis advanced in this paper can be repre- 
sented as a logical extension of the notion that 
coefficients of investment models would be non- 
linear with respect to the business cycle.22 
When growth cycles are considered, the perti- 
nent investment models themselves can be ex- 
pected to change. All of this suggests consider- 
able potential for the life-cycle approach as 
contrasted to models which disregard the stage 
of industry development. Presumably, the 
analysis could be readily adapted to study other 
industries for which we now have time-series 
data. 
'Variation due to changes in capital stock 
= (-0.156) standard deviation of Kt-. = -125.70, 
while variation due to changes in net income 
= (0.706) standard deviation of i** = 237.71. 
'See, for example, the more recent works of Kuh and 
Meyer [19, 181. For an earlier approach see, for example, 
[13] and [7]. 
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APPENDIX 
Sources of Data 23 
IN: 1870-1941, [27, Table C-1, Col. (8), pp. 256- 
257]. 
IG: 1870-1941, [27, Table C-1, Col. (4), pp. 256- 
257]. 
K: 1869-1941, [27, Table C-1, Col. (2), pp. 256- 
257]. 
X: 1880-1941, [27, Table I-13, Col. (2), pp. 472- 
473]. 
1870-1879, extrapolation using Ulmer [27, Table 
I-13, Col. (2), pp. 472-473] and Poor's data in 
Historical Statistics of the United States: Co- 
lonial Times to 1957 (Washington: U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, 1960), Q38, p. 428 after 
the latter had been deflated by q and where 1870 
entry = January 1, 1871. 
q: 1869-1941, [27, Table C-11, Col. (12), pp. 274- 
277]. Combined index of cost of road and equip- 
ment. 
i: 1871-1936: Macauly's unadjusted index of rail- 
road bond yields in Historical Statistics of the 
United States: Colonial Times to 1957, X 332, 
p. 656. 
1936-1941: Moody's average yield on new rail- 
road bonds linked to above. Moody's Railroads, 
1946, Moody's Investor Service, p. a 49. 
7r: 1871-1941: 7r = net operating income plus de- 
preciation deflated by q. Net operating income 
comes from M. Abramovitz's worksheets where 
Poor's data (Historical Statistics of the United 
States: Colonial Times to 1957, Q40 and XQ 
110 + 112, p. 110) has been adjusted to calendar 
years. Depreciation has been taken from [27, 
Table C-12, Col. (7), pp. 278-279] where 1869 
entry = January 1, 1870. 
7r*: 1871-1941: Net operating income deflated by q. 
7**: 1920-1941: Net income deflated by q. Net in- 
come comes from Historical Statistics of the 
United States: Colonial Times to 1957, Q 113, 
p. 434. 
'Due to limitations of space it is not possible to give 
a full description of the time series used in obtaining the 
empirical results. This information will be made available 
upon request. For further identification of the variables 
listed above, the reader may consult the text. 
